The report of the
>International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty< (ICISS)
Summary
“This report is about the
so-called “right of humanitarian intervention”: the question of when, if ever,
it is appropriate for states to take coercive – and in particular military –
action, against another state for the purpose of protecting people at risk in
that other state. …” This
is the beginning of the report of the “International Commission on Intervention
and State Sovereignty”. A few lines later this is followed by a quote from Kofi
Annan who at the 1999 UN plenary meeting and again in the year 2000 (following
the Kosovo conflict and the resulting NATO war against Yugoslavia) appealed to
the international community: “… if humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on
sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica – to gross and
systematic violations of human rights that affect every precept of our common
humanity?”
The Canadian
Government, supported by large foundations, took this appeal as the impetus for
announcing the founding of an international commission to deal with this
problem. Alongside a high ranking Algerian diplomat, the
Australian, Gareth Evans, former Australian Foreign Minister and co-initiator
of the “Canberra Commission”, was made co-chairman, alongside with a high ranking Algerian diplomat. Further Members of the
commission; among the members of the committee
are a former US security service member of the Intelligence
Committee of the US Congress Committee on Intelligence and a former top
NATO general, but also important Third World figurespersonalities,
including a former ANC functionary.
The
commission published the results of its work shortly after the 1111.9 Sept. 20001, under the title:
“The PResponsibility to
Protect”. The 100 page report is very readable and divided into eight chapters:
-
The
Policy Challenge (the dilemma of the principle of national sovereignty
vs. rising numbers of human rights abusesviolations in
countries like Rwanda, Bosnia and Kosovo);
-
A new Approach: “The Responsibility to Protect” (Discussion
of the terms “Sovereignty” vs. “Human Rights”);
-
The Responsibility to Prevent (on
the root causes and prevention as a primary postulate);
-
The Responsibility to React (the
conditions for intervention);
-
The Responsibility to Rebuild (on
the destructive implications of military intervention and the resulting
responsibility for rebuilding);
-
The Question of Authority (on
the authority of the UN and the questioning of the same);
-
The Operational Dimension
(operative dimension – the practical level);
-
The Responsibility to Protect: The Way Forward (The
aim is an factual change in international law, e.g. via a resolution of the UN
plenary meeting, so to change the meaning of “sovereignty of the state” that
military intervention on humanitarian grounds becomes possible.)
The aim is
ultimately to weaken the principle of sovereignty anchored in the UN-Charter:
namely its relativizing via a superior human rights criterion (after in 1945 national sovereignty
was consciously established as a primary principle of equal importance with the
human rights). The results of this factual change in international law would
signify the end of an era: With the relativising of the principle of
sovereignty (which so far can only be set aside in two cases: for the purposes
of self-defense if one is attacked and if world peace is endangered) the
lessons we have learned from two world wars, would in reality be laid aside –
with all (scarcely to be foreseen) consequences.
On the aims and
composition of the commission.
“…
your title really describes what I was talking about: the fact that sovereignty
implies responsibilities as well as powers; and that among these
responsibilities, none is more important than protecting citizens from violence
and war.”[1]
With
these words Kofi Annan commented on the ICISS Report „The Responsibility to
Protect“ in the autumn of 2001, shortly after the 11th September.[2].
The
history of the ICISS began at the so-called Millennium-General Assembly of the
United Nations in September 2000. There, the Canadian Prime Minister, Jean
Crétien announced the founding of an international working group, which would
look at the dilemma between military intervention on humanitarian grounds and
the sovereignty of nations. It was to work towards a solution which would be
compatible with international law.
The
debate was encouraged by the Secretary of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, who
had already put the question as to whether there did not have to be a new
consensus as to how the community of nations should deal with massive
infringements of human rights in the future. The starting point for this was
the NATO war against Yugoslavia, which had just finished, where the Yugoslav
government was accused of infringing human rights and of “ethnic cleansing” in Kosovo
and which was begun counter to international law. But in the background, there was
always the Rwandan genocide which took place in 1994, practically under the
noses of the UN Security Council, because this body could not agree as to how
to proceed and therefore the military intervention, which was demanded from
many quarters, did not take place[3].
After
the ICISS was founded 14th September 2000, it was to hand in a report on its
work within a year.
The 12 members of
the commission were chosen by the
Canadian government. They were to be experts on international relations and
representatives of international assiciations.
They were:
- Gareth Evans (Australia, Co-Chairman),
President of the International Crisis Group, formerly the Australian Minister
of Foreign Affairs, and co-initiator of the Canberra Commission for the
Abolition of Nuclear Weapons;
-
Mohamed Sahnoun
(Algeria, Co-Chairman), Special Advisor to the General Secretary of the UN and,
inter alia, the authorised representative for African, the Great Lakes Region,
former member of the North-South Commission (Brundtland-Commission) and
Ambassador for Algeria in– among others - France, Germany and the USA
-
Gisèle Côté-Harper
(Canada/Quebec), Professor of Law, Member of the UN-Human Rights Committee and
former Chair of the International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic
Development[4];
-
Lee Hamilton (USA),
Director of inter alia, the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars,
formerly a long term Member of Congress, Chairman of the Committee on
International Relations, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and
the Joint Economic Committee of the US Congress;
- Michael
Ignatieff (Canada), Professor of Human Rights at Harvard/USA, published inter
alia texts on ethnic conflict, especially in the Balkans;
- Vladimir
Lukin (Russia), Member of the Duma- and sometime chairman of its foreign
commission, former Russian Ambassador to the USA and one of the founders of
the( neo-) Liberal Jabloko Party;
- Klaus
Naumann (Germany), till 1999 Chairman of the NATO-Military Commission, leading
strategist for the realisation of the new NATO-Doctrine and the 1999 military
intervention against Yugoslavia, based on it, former General Inspector (=
highest ranking officer) of the German Army;
- Cyril
Ramaphosa (South Africa), former ANC-General Secretary, led the development of
the National Union of Mineworkers in the eighties, now Chairman of a service
concern;
- Fidel Ramos
(Philippines),former President of the Philippines, prior to that a high ranking
officer in the Philippine army, now the Chairman of the Ramos Peace and Development
Foundation;
- Cornelio Sommaruga
(Switzerland), formerly inter alia President of the ICRC (International
Committee of the Red Cross), Swiss State Secretary for External Economic
Affairs and acting Chairman of the EFTA (European. Free-Market-Union), today, inter
alia President of the Caux-Foundation for Moral Rearmament;
- Eduardo Stein Barillas
(Guatemala), former Guatemalan Foreign Minister und Chairman of the OAS
(Organisation American States), now the UNDP-Advisor in Panama;
- Ramesh Thakur (India/Canada),
Vice-rector of the United Nations University (Tokyo), prior to this, Professor
in New Zealand und Australia, later as Chairman of the Peace Research Centre at
the Australian National University in Canberra, he took part in the Nuclear
Weapons Non-Proliferation Treaty – Review and Extension Conference and was a
protagonist in the Nuclear Weapons- Test Stop and the International Campaign for
the Ban of Landmines.
In
order to realise the real politic linkage, these members of the commission were
given a board of 15 present and past ministers by the Canadian minister of Foreign
Affairs.
What
is common to both boards, is that they virtually all come from the social
elites, that southern representatives are under represented in relationship to
demographics, that women are massively under represented and the Chinese not
represented at all.
The
report was presented to the public, as planned, at the 56th General Assembly of
the United Nations in the autumn of 2001. But the attacks on the World Trade
Centre and the Pentagon, which had taken place shortly before this, strongly
influenced the debate at the assembly so that the presentation did not get the resonance
that had originally been hoped for. This has not changed much. The report has been
discussed at meetings of heads of state and geo-strategists, at the UNO and the
EU. But the results have hardly reached the public. [5]
The
report is certainly worthy of being looked at by a broader public. For one
thing, its theses and arguments, in spite of what is said, do have more and
more influence on real politic. And, for another, the report aims at a deep and
actual change in International Law:
„The
Responsibility to Protect“ is the attempt at establishing in International
Law a “Right to Humanitarian Intervention“, which did not exist till now: The
right, in fact the duty, to put the core-principle of International Law out of
action under very special circumstances in order to invade the borders of
states, to militarily intervene on their territory and also against their
government. This is to be achieved by the redefining of the term national
sovereignty, for example via a resolution of the UN General Assembly ( See the
final section : How to Implement the ICISS Approach)
The principal
argument of the ICISS approach which is to be found in the title and which is
emphasised again and again in all its considerations is “The Responsibility to
Protect”. That is the responsibility of a state for the protection of and the
welfare of its citizens. This responsibility results, according to the commission,
directly from the existence of state sovereignty, and it therefore lies primarily
with the state in whose sovereign territory the respective population lives.
But, should the
population of a country suffer great harm as the result of an internal war, a
revolt, oppression or a “state failing” to look after its people and should
this state be unwilling or unable to stop this suffering, the intervention of
the International Community of States is required.
According to the
commission this responsibility takes precedence over the principle of state sovereignty
and the guarantee of the inviolability of national territory, which is linked
to it.
This responsibility consists of three
part-responsibilities, from which the actual steps are derived:
„The need to do much better on prevention, and to
exhaust prevention options before rushing to embrace intervention, were
constantly recurring themes in our worldwide consultations, and ones which we
wholeheartedly endorse.”[6]
This
first responsibility is directed at the bases and causes for internal conflict
and other crises caused by people or the results of catastrophes, which
endanger the existence and the welfare of the population. This responsibility
too lies firstly in the hands of sovereign states.
The
bases of conflict prevention are, according to the commission, equal
opportunities for all people, state accountability and defence of human rights.
The promotion and economic development and the fair distribution of resources
also count as keys to successful conflict prevention.
The
commission also remarks that effective prevention of conflict is not possible
without international support. The economic situation of many states is seen as
a particular problem which came into being during the cold war: Debts put a
heavy load on states and result in grave social differences within states and
the inability of states to mobilise their own resources
The unequal
ways in which states are dealt with in international trade and the continuing
dominance of the industrial nations are also outlined as problems.
„The Trade policies applied by many richer
industrialized countries unfairly disadvantaging or restricting access to
markets, together with the terms of trade being experienced by many developing
countries, have not made any easier the reduction of that dept burden, or the
capacity to meet the social and economic development needs of their populations.“[7]
The early
detection of conflict is seen as a particularly important element of
prevention. Thus it is emphasised that in a first phase especially NGOs like
Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch or the International Crisis Group
should extend their activates in this direction, so that they can give early
warning of developing conflicts. The required logistic and analytical ability
are not available within the UN at the moment and will probably not be achieved
in the near future, so that the emphasis must remain on the NGOs. The formation
of an information service which reports direct to the General Secretary should
however be aimed at.
There are two
types of measure which the commission recommends should be taken:
- Root Causes Prevention Efforts;
- Direct Prevention Efforts [8].
1.1.
Root Causes Prevention Efforts: function
The Commission
bases the necessity of fighting the deeper and long-term causes of conflict, Root
Causes, on Article 55 of the UN-Charta, which inter alia, which explicitly
asks for economic, social and health problems to be solved: “… explicitly
recognizes that solutions to international economic, social, health and related
problems; international, cultural and educational cooperation; and universal
respect for human rights are all essential for ‘the creation of conditions of
stability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly
relations among nations’.”[9]
Therefore, the role of the United Nations is primarily to establish stable
relations which serve as the basis for the peaceful co-existence of nations.
Poverty, repression and the unfair distribution of resources are generally and
increasingly accepted to be the causes, without which the development of armed
conflict can not be understood: „There is a growing and widespread recognition that armed conflicts cannot be understood without reference
to such ‚root’ causes as poverty, political repression, and uneven distribution
of resources.”[10]
The
Commission names the following points, which it takes from the primary
conditions, for the prevention of conflict for practical purposes:
- The political needs and deficiencies: The existence of
democratic institutions, separation of powers, establishment of trust between
the different groups in society, freedom of the press, rule of law etc.
- Tackling economic deprivation: Development aid
and support, better terms of trade and greater access to external markets,
economic and structural reforms, technical help and the strengthening of regulatory
institutions. The idea that these structural reforms could be responsible for
the precarious situation of the states is not entertained!
- Strengthening legal protection: Supporting the
judicial system, independent judiciary, minority rights and the support for
organisations which are engaged in strengthening human rights.
- Reforms to the military and other state security
services: Improved training and education of the military, reintegration of
former fighters, strengthening of civil control mechanisms, extending to the
banning of land mines and the control of light weapons.
1.2. Direct Prevention Efforts
Direct Prevention Efforts include the same dimensions as Root Causes
Prevention Efforts, but differ in the methods and the speed of their
availability, as well as the shorter duration:
- Political and diplomatic direct prevention measures
include direct action on the part of the General Secretary as well as fact
finding missions, appeals, mediation and,
negatively speaking, sanctions, diplomatic isolation, suspension of
organization membership and travel restrictions.
- Economic Direct Prevention Measures might, on the positive side, include promises of
investment or of better trade conditions. What should be watched though is that
they don’t have the opposite effect. „Special care is required to ensure
that such assistance helps to prevent or alleviate conflict issues, and does
not exacerbate them.”[11]
On the negative side these measures may include trade sanctions, the withdrawal
of investments or of the support of the IMF or the World Bank.
- Measures of a
legal nature: To offer mediation, or
arbitration, the establishment of the ICC (International Criminal Court), and
tribunals for war criminals etc.
- Measures of a military nature should be more limited, „but nonetheless important
to mention“[12].They might
include preventative deployment of troops or the „use of force“, which
should always be carefully considered and always be the last choice.: „Intervention
should only be considered when prevention fails.“[13]
All these methods
fall under prevention of violence. That is they are to end conflict or to
prevent its development. This happens by removing resources, like weapons and
financial support, but also by trying to employ measures of peaceful conflict
settlement. This often requires the agreement of the states concerned. This is,
in the case of the Responsibility to Prevent either present or should be
achieved through the methods mentioned.
If the state is not willing or not able to respond to these demands, and
preventative methods do not take effect or are not permitted, then, according
to the commission, out of the responsibility to prevent the responsibility
to act should result.
„When preventive
measures fail to resolve or contain the situation and when a state is unwilling
to redress the situation, then interventionary measures by other members of the
broader community of states may be required. These coercive measures may
include political, economic or judicial measures, and in extreme cases - but
only extreme cases - they may also include military action.”[14]
In its consideration,
the commission weighs the sovereignty of states against the universal and
individual worth of human rights, and comes to the conclusion that the aim of
state sovereignty is the assurance of individual human rights, which makes
these take precedence over state sovereignty. From this the commission
concludes that, if severe human rights infringements take place in a state,
sovereignty no longer fulfils its purpose and thus the state no longer deserves
it. The postulated responsibility to protect the population then passes over to
the United Nations.
The reaction of
the United nations should be orientated to the requirements of the people who
are in need. The measures that are to be taken should also be selected according
to this criterion. Therefore the primary aim should always be to avoid
intervention. – as it is assumed that intervention will always do harm to the
people. The states right of self-determination is of high value and should only
be withdrawn in extreme cases.
Various forms of
sanctions are named as possible modes of low level reaction which should always
be tried first. These are, divided according to possible types of response:
- military:
Weapons embargos, the termination of military support and training programmes;
- economic:
financial sanctions, cutting off the income of rebel movements, terrorist
organisations, etc. Blocking of the sources of income such as oil, diamonds and
drugs;
- political
and diplomatic: Restrictions on diplomatic representation, restrictions on
travel, exclusion from or non-admittance in international organisations.
The report lays
emphasis on the conditions which must be fulfilled before it comes to the last
resort: military intervention on the territory of the state concerned. For this
case procedures, conditions and exclusion criteria are enumerated
The decision to intervene militarily in a sovereign
state may, according to the commission, only take place in „extreme and
exceptional cases“[15]
, as there is no doubt that the right of self-determination as it is stated in
the UN Charta is then invalidated. The importance of this existing sovereignty
as a form of protection against attacks on ethnic, cultural or political
grounds is noted by the commission, but is placed behind the new responsibility
to protect individual human rights in certain situations:
„The
non-interference rule not only protects states and governments: it also
protects people and cultures, enabling societies to maintain the religious,
ethnic and civilizational differences that they cherish.“ (…) “Yet there are
exceptional circumstances in which the very interest that all states have in
maintaining a stable international order requires them to react when all order
within a state has broken down or when conflict and repression are so violent
that civilians are threatened with massacre, genocide or ethnic cleansing on a
large scale.”[16]
But, in its
report the commission emphasises that the barriers to military intervention
should be very high. An obligatory condition is that the developments in the
said state present a clear and acute threat to international security, or that
massive human rights infringements are taking place.
The commission
lists six criteria for military intervention:
A just cause is seen as the most important criterion,
and is this the threshold criterion. This would be fulfilled by only two two
types of events:
„In the
Commission’s view, military intervention for human protection purposes is
justified in two broad sets of circumstances, namely in order to halt or avert:
- large
scale loss of life, actual or apprehended, with genocidal intent or not, which
is the product either of deliberate state action, or state neglect or inability
to act, or a failed state situation, or
-
large scale “ethnic cleansing” actual or apprehended,
whether carried out by killing, forced expulsion, acts of terror or rape.”[17]
Military
intervention may only take place,
-if the lives of
a large number of people are placed in acute danger and the state is not
willing or able to prevent it,
- or if ethnic
cleansing takes place on a large scale.
The commission
includes the following scenarios:
-
a large number of human lives are threatened, or a
large number of people are killed, through the activities of the state or its
lack of action, or genocide;
-
ethnic cleansing, which takes place on a large scale;
-
crimes against humanity or war crimes according to the
Geneva Convention, which could have or have brought about the deaths of a large
number of people;
-
the collapse of the state and the fear that mass
starvation or civil war could result;
-
huge natural and environmental catastrophes, if the
state is unable or unwilling to help and a great number of people are
endangered or killed.
In these cases it
is not important whether the violence comes from the state or another source
and if the violence is taking place within the state or extends over the
borders.
The
proof for a situation to exist that justifies intervention
should, at best, come from an independent, non-state source. A possible
candidate would be the ICRC (International Committee of the Red Cross) – which
has already explicitly refused to take over such a task, as it would have severe
repercussions for its role as a recognised neutral charitable organisation.
According to the ICISS the collection of information is difficult and one
should therefore, in case of need, use not only the reports of the UN bodies,
but also particularly those of NGOs.
The commission is
of the opinion that events which do not take these extreme forms, such as
racial discrimination, systematic imprisonment or oppression of the political
opposition give no grounds for military intervention. In these cases sanctions
may well be applied, but not military intervention. Neither are a military
putsch or the wish of the people for democratic reform grounds for the same.
Another case is the
use of military force to get ones own citizens out of danger in a foreign
country. This too is no reason for humanitarian intervention. It is, however,
according to the commission, a right covered by article 51 of the UN Charta.
The same applies for the use of military force as a response to terrorist
attacks.
There follow four
further criteria which must be fulfilled. Together, according to the ICISS
commission, they should strictly limit the cases in which military intervention
may be used:
b. Right
Intention:
„The primary
purpose of the intervention must be to halt or avert human suffering.“[18]
The changing of
borders, the wish of individual populations groups for independence, or the desire
for a change of regime, can not be seen as adequate grounds:
In order to
prevent the intervention from being seen as serving the interests of another country,
the intervention should be decided as multilaterally as possible and carried
out by a coalition of a number of countries. Public opinion in the region
should be considered in order to prevent such an impression from arising.
The report though
does assert that in case of an intervention the interests of an intervening
state may be affected.: „Apart from economic or strategic interests, that
self interest could, for example, take the understandable form of a concern to
avoid refugee outflows, or a haven for drug producers or terrorists, developing
in one’s neighbourhood.”[19]
But these
interests are not seen as a problem, as for example, the avoidance of floods of
refugees or terrorist activities are seen as being in the interests of all nations.
c. Last
Resort:
„Every diplomatic
and non-military avenue for the prevention or peaceful resolution of the
humanitarian crisis must have been explored.“[20]
Only when the
responsibility to prevent conflict has been totally exhausted, can the responsibility
to act come into action and justify intervention.
d. Proportional
Means:
„The scale,
duration and intensity of the planned military intervention should be the
minimum necessary to secure the humanitarian objective in question.“[21]
It is of primary
concern that any intervention in the political system of a state is kept to a
minimum, and that it is only affected to the degree which is necessary to
achieve the objective. The provisions of humanitarian international law must be
observed.
e. Reasonable
Prospects:
„Military action
can only be justified if it stands a reasonable chance of success, that is,
halting or averting the atrocities or suffering that triggered the intervention
in the first place. Military action is not justified if actual protection
cannot be achieved, or if the consequences of embarking upon the intervention
are likely to be worse than if there is no action at all.”[22]
Military
intervention requires that it stands a good chance of success. If this is not
relatively certain, or should the danger exist, that the situation for the
people could be made worse by the use of violence, then military intervention
is out of question.
„The
responsibility to protect implies the responsibility not just to prevent or to
react, but to follow through and rebuild.”[23]
The
responsibility to act is followed by the responsibility to rebuild. This
includes the provision of all types of help in the rebuilding of infrastructure
and the reconciliation of groups which were in conflict with one another. The
responsibility to protect does not end with military intervention, but includes
rebuilding, the establishment of a lasting peace and sustainable development,
as well as the so-called „Good Gouvernance“. Specific measures, such as
the undoing of ethnic cleansing, disarming and reintegration of combatants are
listed.
The conditions
under which the use of violence may be authorized are set down in the
UN-Charta. In articles 43 and 51 particularly. The only body which can make
this decision is the Security Council.
In article 42 it
says the Security Council “may take such action by air, sea or land forces
as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security”.
Article 51 allows
the use of military power „the inherent right of individual or collective
self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the UN“: the
so-called right to self-defence of a sovereign state when it is attacked or
when an attack is imminent.
The commission
also sees no organ more suitable to legalise such intervention, than the
Security Council. So, before any intervention the agreement of the Security
Council should be sought and it should involve itself in order to find suitable
solutions. But that also means that if the Security Council can not agree on measures
to be taken, other groups of states or even individual states can take military
aktion:
„In view of the
Council’s past inability or unwillingness to fulfill the role expected of it,
if the Security Council expressly rejects a proposal for intervention where
humanitarian or human rights issues are significantly at stake, or the Council
fails to deal with such a proposal within a reasonable time, it is difficult to argue that alternative means
of discharging the responsibility to protect can be entirely discounted.”[24]
If the UN-General Assembly should, in the great majority, agree to
military intervention, this would also provide a high degree of legitimacy.
Regional organisations could also be better suited for this task of
intervention, because they know the context better and the regional
peculiarities. The problem of legitimacy of these organisations is answered by
the commission with the question as to where the greatest wrong lies: in the
bypassing of the Security Council or in its standing by while severe human
rights infringements take place:
„It is a real
question in these circumstances where lies the most harm: in the damage
to international order if the Security Council is bypassed or in the damage to
that order if human beings are slaughtered while the Security Council stands
by.“[25]
Here one finds - once more according to the previously
defined steps, starting with prevention, but with emphasis on the complex of
military intervention - numerous details about how the previously regimented options
are to be realized, going as far as the transition to civil administration.
This operative level will not be taken any further here.
The final paragraph, however, in which the commission
makes suggestions for international legal implementation, is important.
How to Implement the ICISS Approach
In the
final paragraph „The Responsibility to Protect – the Way Forward“ it is
considered how the hurdle, which has been set up by international law written
down in the UN Charta to protects states from violent attack, can, according to
the targets given in the report, be overcome. Thus, the report returns to its
starting point: The question, whether the use of constraint, in particular of military
force, against a state in order to protect endangered people in this other
state. Seen in relationship to the clearly stated principle of national
sovereignty in the UN Charta – which pertains to all states, regardless of
their size, riches or power – this is certainly not a bagatelle problem, in
spite of all the arguments and conditions formulated in the seven chapters.
In
this last chapter the report is less detailed than it was, but suggests a very specific
mechanism: Having reformulated the concept of state sovereignty, so that it is
necessarily linked to the responsibility of the state to protect its citizens
as defined by the commission („The Responsibility to Protect“ – Ch. 2),
the implementation under international law could be achieved by the UN General
Assembly voting on this definition.
The
result would be that this “new definition” would be a substantial change in
international law. Because its central and key concept “state sovereignty” has,
because of its clarity, never been the object of debate.
The
achievement of this change (which would change the meaning of the UN Charta,
but would stand outside of the Charta) via a resolution of a UN Plenary
Session, would be a remarkable trick. Because it would naturally be easier than
trying to touch the UN Charta itself. In fact, it would be a deep change in its
meaning with possible consequences of dimensions which have not even started to
be discussed by a broader public.
Helge
von Horn (Root
Causes – Project Coordinator)
Christoph
Krämer (IPPNW
Germany)
March
2004
Literature:
- Chesterman,
Simon: Discussions at the Release of The Responsibility to Protect,
International
Peace Academy 2002; http://www.ipacademy.org/PDF_Reports/UNDIP-IPA.pdf
- Evans,
Gareth: Humanity did not
justify this war; 14.05.2003;
http://www.ccmep.org/2003%20Articles/051403humanity_did_not_justify_this_war.htm
- ICISS (International
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty): The Responsibility to
Protect,
Ottawa 2001;
http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/iciss-ciise/menu-en.asp
- Süddeutsche
Zeitung: Irak Debatte – Berlin bestreitet Konflikt mit London;
München,
13.07.2003
-------------
Following
on this overview of the contents of the ICISS report and the manner of its
origins, a political analysis and assessment of the report– its goals,
implications and expected results - will appear in this journal
[1] Chesterman 2002,
S. 2 “… your title really describes, what I was talking about: the fact that
sovereignty implies responsibilities as well as powers; and that among this
responsibilities, none is more important than protecting citizens from violence
and war.”
[2] Internet addresses. Literature on the subject
in all various languages.
[3] The debate, as
Evans later (2003) noted „... was stimulated by the hopelessly inadequate
response to the massacre in Rwanda 1994 and in Bosnia a year later, as well as
the inability of the Security Council to agree on intervention in Kosovo in
1999.”
[4] (International Centre for Human Rights and
Democratic Development)
[5] Perhaps the most public debate was animated
by a dispute between Gerhard Schröder and Tony Blair, as to whether the results
of the report should be incorporated into a strategic paper on Social Democratic
perspectives, which the Süddeutschen Zeitung reported. (SZ von 13.07.2003)
[6] ICISS 2001, P. 19
[7] ICISS 2001, P. 20
[8] note the imprecise meaning of the
„prevention“ compared with the German „Prävention“
[9] ICISS 2001, P. 22
[10] ibid., P. 22
[11] ICISS 2001, S. 24
[12] ibid., S. 25
[13] ibid., S. 25
[14] ICISS 2001, P. 29
[15] ibid., P. 31
[16] ibid., P. 31
[17] ICISS 2001., P. 32
[18] ICISS 2001, P. 35
[19] ibid., P. 36
[20] ibid., P. 36
[21] ibid., P. 37
[22] ICISS 2001, P. 37
[23] ibid., P. 39
[24] ICISS 2001, P. 53
[25] ibid., P. 55